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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLEO R. POWELL, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 13,939 
DICK E. BASTIAN, DEE V. SHARP, ) 
dba SHARP REALTY, and Provo 
Branch PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS ) 
g LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Federally 
Chartered Savings and Loan ) 
Association, 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
DICK E. BASTIAN 
NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiff Cleo Powell claims that a sale by her of real 
property to defendant Dick E. Bastian was in fact a mortgage; 
she sued to recover what she claimed was unlawful interest 
and sales expenses wrongfully charged to her, and for damages. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court found the transaction to be a sale with 
an option to repurchase and found against the plaintiff's conten-
tions. The trial court granted plaintiff judgment for title 
costs which-had been tendered by Bastian in his pleadings and 
for $228.33 taxes. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Dick E. Bastian seeks affirmance of the trial 
court's judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent Bastian agrees with the facts of the case 
as stated by the appellant. The appellant in her statement 
of the facts of the case at page 4 of her brief states that 
the facts "are substantially the same as the facts found in 
the trial court's findings of fact (R 101), . . . " 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN THE ABSENCE OF A STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OR OF 
A STATEMENT OF THE EVIDENCE AS PROVIDED IN 
RULE 75(m), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PRESUMED TO BE SUPPORTED 
BY EVIDENCE 
Plaintiff elected to perfect her appeal without furnishing 
the court a transcript of the evidence in the trial court. Neither 
was a substitute for a transcript provided. Under earlier statutes, 
such an appeal would be an appeal on the judgment roll. 
Under the former practice where bills of exception were 
perfected, the uniform rule was that in the absence of a bill 
of exceptions, the parties were bound by the findings of fact 
made by the trial court. Such was the holding of the following 
Utah cases: McGuire v. State Bank of Tremonton, et. al. , 164 
P. 494; Byron, et. al. v. Utah Copper Company, 178 P. 53; Jensen 
v. Jensen, et. al., 269 P. 485; Sidney Stevens Implement Company 
v^ Ogden City, 33 P. 2d 181 and Keller v^ Chournous, 77 P. 2d 
626. 
The findings of the court in this case are that the transaction 
between Powell and Bastian was one of a sale of the Powell property 
by Powell to Bastian with the reservation of an option to 
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repurchase the property by Powell. In the absence of any factual 
material which can be examined by this court, it is difficult 
to see how the trial court's findings can be disturbed. 
POINT II 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES DETERMINES WHETHER A 
CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY IS A SALE OR IS 
INTENDED TO BE A MORTGAGE 
The fullest treatment by the Utah Supreme Court of the 
elements of disputes in cases where there is a question as to 
whether a deed was intended as a fee simple conveyance or as 
a mortgage is found in Kjar v. Brimley, 27 U. 2d 411, 497 P. 
2d 23. At page 25 the court said: 
V/hether a transaction in the form of a sale with an 
option to repurchase is in fact a sale, or a loan disguised 
as a sale to cover up a scheme to collect usurious interest 
is an issue for the trier of fact. The controlling 
question is what was the intention of the parties as 
it existed at the time of the execution and delivery 
of the instrument? A mortgage may exist, although the 
mortgagee has no right to compel payment. The law may 
imply a promise to repay a debt under particular circumstances 
of any case, where it is clear that the lender had relied 
on the property for his security, being satisfied that 
he is protected by its high value in relation to the 
amount loaned. If there be a large margin between the 
debt or sum advanced and the value of the land conveyed, 
this represents an assurance of payment stronger than 
any promise or bond of a necessitous borrower or debtor. 
The trier of fact determined that the transaction was In 
fact a sale with an option to repurchase. Finding of Fact number 
10 reads as follows: 
10. The court finds that the plaintiff Powell testi-
fied at all times that her arrangement with the defendant 
Bastian -was one by terms of which she had an option 
to repurchase the property for a three month period. 
The court finds that there is no instance in the record 
In which the transaction between the plaintiff Powell 
and the defendant Bastian was characterized as anything 
other than as a sale to Mr. Bastian with an option 
on the part of Mrs. Powell to repurchase the property. 
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The appellant does not cite any evidence to contradict 
that finding. In fact, the appellant concedes that the facts 
were as they were found by the court. Appellant has included 
as part of the record the deposition of Mrs. Powell. Her deposition 
was not introduced as evidence and is not properly before this 
court. If it is considered, it will substantiate the Findings 
of Fact as made by the trial court. 
On this record it is respectfully urged that the Supreme 
Court has no choice but to affirm the trial courtTs finding 
that the transaction was a sale with an option to repurchase 
the property. 
POINT III 
THE OPTION TO REPURCHASE THE PROPERTY WAS IN FACT 
EXERCISED AND MRS. POWELL WAS THE SELLER 
The Findings of Fact recite that in August of 1970 Mrs. 
Powell listed the property for sale with Boley Realty. When 
an offer was obtained from Martin L. Ethington and Lois E. 
Ethington, Mrs. Powell signed the "Earnest Money Agreement 
and Offer to Purchase.11 She then requested Mr. Bastian to 
sign it too. The transaction with the Ethingtons was closed 
by Prudential Savings and Loan Association. 
The sale to the Ethingtons was made at the sole instance 
and direction of Mrs. Powell. She listed the property in order 
to exercise her option to repurchase it. She might have specified 
that the money be paid from Ethingtons to her and then to Bastian. 
She did not do so and she was paid in accordance with the terms 
of the option agreement except for the matter of title insurance 
and taxes in the amount of $22 8.33, which the court found that 
Bastian should pay. 
The option price to Mrs. Powell was $18,000.00 plus 8% 
interest on $16,00.0.00 for the period of time that the option 
remained unexercised. If the option had remained unexercised 
then Bastian would have retained ownership of the property. 
If the transaction had in fact been a mortgage, then it 
could be argued that there was an excess charge of interest. 
It is pointless to talk about usury when the uncontroverted 
facts say that the relationship was a sale with a retained 
option. 
It may be presumptious of Bastian not to reply briefly to 
appellantfs argument with respect to the claim of usury. For 
that reason only, Bastianfs understanding of that law is set 
forth even though, under his view, it is not relevant. 
As nearly as this respondent can understand the Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code, the transaction between Bastian and Powell 
was a "consumer related loan." Bastian concludes that by virtue 
of Title 703-3-602, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Title 70B-3^602 
refers to Title 70B-3-201 as the statute fixing the maximum 
interest allowable. That rate is 18% per annum. 
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code does not contain any 
specific provision providing for the consequences of usury 
in a consumer related loan. 
The only statutory provision that appears to apply Is 
Tirle 703-5-202(3). That statute does not make the obligation 
void but merely provides that a debtor has a right to a refund 
if he has paid interest in excess of the amount allowed by 
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law or to a credit for an excess amount charged but not paid. 
The annotatorfs note to Title 70B-5-202 indicates that 
70B-5-202C2) is the statutory relief granted to a debtor who 
borrows money at a rate in excess of 18% from a person not autho-
rized to make such a loan. 
The annotatorTs statement would seem to be too broad. 
Title 70B~5-202(2) deals with creditors who have violated provisions 
of the act applying to authority to make supervised loans. 
A "supervised loan" is defined by Title 70B-3-50K3) .. That 
section reads, 
(3) 'Supervised loan1 means a regulated loan in 
which the rate of the loan finance charge exceeds 18 
per cent per year as determined according to the provi-
sions on loan finance charge for consumer loans 
(section 70B-3-201). 
A regulated loan is one made by a "Regulated Lender" who is 
a person engaged in the business of making regulated loans. 
There is nothing in the record to show that Bastian is 
a regulated lender so that statute would not apply if the transac-
tion had been a loan, which it was not. 
It appears to this respondent that the only statute which 
could have application would be Title 70B-5-202(3) . If we were 
concerned with a debtor-creditor relationship, which we are 
not, then a common law right may exist to recover interest paid 
in excess of allowed amounts as indicated by the annotation 
in 59 ALR 2d 526. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Bastian respectfully represents that the 
Findings of Fact made by the trial court were correct and are 
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binding upon this court in the absence of a record which can 
be examined by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
, „
f<Ltfjg& /ri f^c^at^*? 
DALLAS H. YOUNG/ JR . for/ 
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48 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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